Best to do ‘administrative process’ BEFORE being dragged into “court” fiction –
SPEAKER: Mr. Tony Davis
THE IRS CODE IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS
Administratively, or in court, the IRS code is void for vagueness.
No person could possibly know what is required according to this law.
The first thing I would say were I similarly situated is that the IRS code is void for vagueness, and no reasonable person could understand this statute.
In American constitutional law, a statute is void for vagueness and unenforceable if it is too vague for the average citizen to understand. There are several reasons a statute may be considered vague; in general, a statute might be called void for vagueness reasons when an average citizen cannot generally determine what persons are regulated, what conduct is prohibited, or what punishment may be imposed. Criminal laws which do not state explicitly and definitely what conduct is punishable for example are void for vagueness. A statute is also void for vagueness if a legislature’s delegation of authority to judges and/or administrators is so extensive that it would lead to arbitrary prosecutions. Related to the “void for vagueness” concept is the “unconstitutional vagueness” concept.
In the case of vagueness, a statute might be considered void on constitutional grounds. Specifically, roots of the vagueness doctrine extend into the two due process clauses, in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The courts have generally determined that vague laws deprive citizens of their rights without fair process, thus violating due process.
The following pronouncement of the void for vagueness doctrine was made by Justice Sutherland in Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926):
[T]he terms of a penal statute […] must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties… and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.
The void for vagueness doctrine is a constitutional rule. This rule requires that criminal laws are so written that they explicitly and definitely state what conduct is punishable. The void for vagueness doctrine thus serves two purposes. First: All persons receive a fair notice of what is punishable and what is not. Second: The vagueness doctrine helps prevent arbitrary enforcement of the laws and arbitrary prosecutions. There is however no limit to the conduct that can be criminalized, when the legislature does not set minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement.
There are at least two ways a law might be attacked for being unconstitutionally vague:
When a law does not specifically enumerate the practices that are either required or prohibited. In this case, the ordinary citizen does not know what the law requires. Also see Coates v. Cincinnati.
When a law does not specifically detail the procedure followed by officers or judges of the law. As a guard, a law must particularly detail what officers are to do, providing both for what they must do and what they must not do. Judges must, under the doctrine, have a clear understanding of how they are to approach and handle a case.
Scienter and objective criteria that specify the harm to be protected against are necessary to limit vagueness in criminal statutes (Compare page 9 of). To satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, individuals are entitled to understand the scope and nature of statutes which might subject them to criminal penalties. Thus, in Skilling v. United States, it was held that a “penal statute must define the criminal offense (1) with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and (2) in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”
The statutory scheme at 26 USC fails to provide notice of tax liability, and operates in a manner incomprehensible to the individual of ordinary intelligence. The tax is not imposed by clear and unequivocal language, so prosecution under 26 USC violates due process.
Defendant seeks prooof that in personam jurisdiction exists in this case. See:
- US v. Warner, #3:07-CR-00123-RRB US Dist. Court in Anchorage, AK (2008) – Eugene George Warner challenged s6 CFR 1.1-1 as derogation or vitiation of statutory constraint or limitations. The exchange in that case shows that the DOJ deemed Warner’s claim to be a “citizen of the United States” to be a claim that he is a nonresident alien. The court never issued a memorandum decision of the issue but rather simply rode the coat tails of the DOJ through sentencing.
- US v. Warner, #3:07-CR-00123-RRB – Eugene Warner’s second motion to dismiss sought dismissal of certain counts of his indictment based on the § 83 conclusion briefed herein. In opposition the DOJ cited cases that in no way considered the language of the statutes (26 USC §§ 83, 212, 1001, 1011, and 1012) at the heart of his contention. The court issued no memorandum decision of its own on this issue but rather rested on the [briefing] offered in the DOJ’s opposition pleading.
- In Warner, US Dist. Sr. Judge Ralph R. Beistline could only say the conclusions in both of the above motions were, “The motion is without merit on its face, for personam jurisdiction does exist in this case.
- US v. Arant, 102 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5633 (2008) (2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12598) (#C-07-0509-RSL, W.D. of WA at Seattle) – In a 2007 civil tax case alleging Mr. Arant’s operation of an abusive tax shelter. Then US District Chief Judge, Robert A. Lasnik, issued this ruling which cites three utterly irrelevant decisions while seemingly holding that the assessment of a tax (26 USC § 6201) is the imposition of a tax for the purposes of Mr. Arant’s claim that he’s implicated only through the terms of 26 CFR 1.1-1 and
not by statute as required by the 16th Amendment. If one follows this line of reasoning they’d conclude that one owes no tax until there’s been an assessment, which is a ludicrous notion. What stands out most is the fact that he cited three decisions instead of a statutory basis for the taxation of Americans under 26 USC.
- Talmage v. Comm’r of IRS, 101 F.3d 695 (CA4 Nov. 15, 1996) (unpublished decision) reveals that the exclusion of the value of Appellant’s personal services from “the value of any money or property paid” in 26 CFR 1.83-3(g) is an arbitrary exclusion, which is impermissible. It is through the operation of § 83 alone that amounts are included in gross income. Decisions where § 83 was not in evidence cannot rightfully be drawn upon as dispositive.
It cannot be proposed in the least that the Defendant has set forth any well founded proposal as to how the law operates to implicate Americans, or as to how the value of personal services is duly included in gross income pursuant to § 83(a). When Defendant finds this minimal expectation impossible to satisfy, how can the individual of ordinary intelligence be viewed as having been made aware of his duties and liabilities?
“It is well established that a statute must give a defendant “fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden.” United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). Specifically, an individual may not be prosecuted for violating tax laws when the statutory provisions at issue are “vague or highly debatable” or the governing law is “completely unsettled by any clearly relevant precedent.” United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir. 1974) (finding that a defendant who had been informed by a government agency that she would not be subject to taxation under an ambiguous provision of the tax code lacked the intent necessary to support a conviction for tax evasion). In United States v. Mallas, 762 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1985), another case involving the scope and application of an ambiguous tax law, the Fourth Circuit cited Critzer in holding that, “where the law is vague or highly debatable, a defendant – actually or imputedly – lacks the requisite intent to violate it.” Mallas, 762 F.2d at 363 (citations omitted).”
See Franklin Sanders v. William E. Freeman, Jr. And Charles Burson, 221 F.3d 846 (CA6 2000). And –
“In United States v. Critzer, the Court reversed a conviction for willful tax evasion where the law under which the Defendant was charged was “so uncertain that even co-ordinate branches of the United States government plausibly reach directly opposing conclusions.” 498 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir.1974). The Court noted that, “[e]ven if [the defendant] had consulted the law and sought to guide herself accordingly, she could have had no certainty as to what the law required.” Id. As a result, “the element of willfulness could not be proven” in that case. Id. at 1163. United States v. Mallas, 762 F.2d 361 (4th Cir.1985), and United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 97 S.Ct. 22, 50
So if you learn these ways to win, then you will know how to win administratively or pretrial and much more.
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